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13 Soviet generals shifted,

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Special to The Globe

WASHINGTON — Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev reassigned 13 commanding generals of the Red Army from December 1980 to January 1981 in a campaign to defeat pressures from inside the Politburo to invade Poland.

This is the thesis of a scholarly article in the March-April 1982 issue of the journal, *Problems of Communism*, by Richard D. Anderson, a former Soviet affairs analyst in the CIA who now works for Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.). The Globe obtained galley proofs of the article, which is scheduled for release today.

Anderson obtained his facts and analysis mainly from articles and revealing tidbits in *Pravda*, *Red Star* and other Soviet publications.

Of the 10 top military posts in the five Soviet commands bordering Poland, five changed hands. "This rate of turnover in two months was three times the average annual turnover for all posts at the military district level or higher during 1970-1976," Anderson wrote.

Their replacements, according to Anderson, were commanders and chiefs of political directorates with close personal ties to Brezhnev.

Moreover, the reassignment began in early December 1980, "as the mobilization of ground forces around Poland was nearing its peak."

The most dramatic demotions were those of Gen. I.G. Pavlovskiy, commander in chief of the Soviet ground forces, and Gen. F.P. Vasygin, chief of the ground forces' political directorate.

Both were reassigned to the Main Inspectorate, which Anderson described in a Globe interview as "a parking place for elderly generals." Pavlovskiy's first assignment in his new post, says Anderson, was to go on "a speaking tour of eastern Siberia."

Press officers in the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency and State Department have no comment on this thesis. Privately, some intelligence officials say that they knew about many of the reshufflings.

According to Anderson, shortly after Soviet forces bordering Poland began to mobilize in late November 1980, a series of articles began to appear in *Pravda* and *Red Star*, obliquely pointing to conflicts within the Politburo and the military as to whether to invade Poland.

Anderson cites an article that appeared in the military journal *Red Star* on the 1920 Soviet-Polish war, which Anderson notes is normally mentioned only in passing in the Soviet

analyst says

USSR are quite close." Among the sentences in that article was a quote from Lenin: "War with Poland is forced upon us."

Anderson also points to signs outside the press. On Nov. 26, as pressures surrounded him, Brezhnev met with Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ill.), who had been given only two hours' notice that Brezhnev wished to meet with him. Percy told Brezhnev that an invasion of Poland would shatter hope for an arms control agreement.

Also in late November, Brezhnev confirmed he would visit India. Writes Anderson, "The invasion of Afghanistan was creating internal and diplomatic difficulties for the Indians, and Brezhnev could count on them to complain about the continuing presence of Soviet troops there."

Anderson argues that "one of the classic uses of diplomacy is to influence a domestic debate by scheduling meetings with foreigners carefully chosen to supply information favorable to one side of the debate, and Brezhnev's diplomacy at this time tended to stress the potential costs of intervention."

Members of the Soviet military, realizing Brezhnev's ploy, struck back. Anderson reports that right after Brezhnev met with Percy, *Red Star* cited Friedrich Engels as the authority for the view that "military movements are not to be subordinated to the wishes and plans of diplomats, but to their own rules which cannot be violated without endangering the whole expedition."

Brezhnev's chance to control the pressures came in early December, perhaps two weeks into the mobilization of forces around Poland. According to Western press accounts of a couple of months later, confirmed by Anderson's reading of the Soviet press at the time, the mobilization was a disaster — reservists deserted, units were moving back and forth in disorganized fashion.

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